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What is Corporate Law's Place in Promoting
Societal Welfare?:
An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein
Randall S. Thomast
Professor William Klein has made many important and long-lasting
contributions to the field of corporate law. My debt to him began over ten years
ago when I started using his casebook, Business Associations. Agency,
Partnerships, and Corporations. It shaped my teaching and my thinking in
many ways, as I am sure it has done for countless others. Along the way I have
read much of Bill's scholarship, and I have always found that it contributed
valuable insights to my understanding of the field. Now, once again he has
helped me to think about a tremendously valuable project: elaborating a set of
criteria for evaluating corporate law. As is apparent from all of the papers in
this Symposium, this is a very challenging task.
Bill has provided us with an interesting outline of potential criteria for
evaluating what is good corporate law. After mulling over his criteria, I am not
sure that any single one completely captures my views. It strikes me that the
overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist private parties to create
wealth for themselves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict
uncompensated negative externalities upon third parties. The rationale for this
is not controversial: the state should encourage private businesses that produce
goods and services because creating greater wealth is generally beneficial to
society. Corporate law can act as a helpful precondition for faster economic
growth by protecting private parties' expectations, encouraging savings and
investment, reducing transaction costs, minimizing agency costs, and
compensating third parties for any harm that they may suffer from this business
activity. Let me elaborate briefly on each of these points.
My first principle for good corporate law is that private parties should be
able to bargain to maximize their wealth. The protection of private bargains
should, therefore, be a bedrock principle of corporate law. This idea rests on the
principle of Pareto optimality, that is, that generally the parties would not agree
to a bargain that did not make each of them better off. From an ex ante
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perspective, adherence to this principle gives each party incentives to bargain
for the best deal possible without the threat of having to renegotiate the
outcome in the future.
It is important to recognize, though, that people operate subject to bounded
rationality, that is, they make decisions based on imperfect information and
with limited abilities to process that information. Better information at a lower
cost can help rational investors make better investment decisions. This is an
important justification for government intervention in creating and distributing
information. One can view the federal securities laws, for instance, as a
relatively low-cost method of widely disseminating important financial
information about publicly held companies, cheaper than the alternative of
having each investor spend substantial resources verifying whatever
information firms might choose to distribute voluntarily or the alternative of
having every analyst incur duplicative search costs to learn the same thing.
Individual cognitive limits on processing and interpreting information may
also lead us to consider intervening in the private bargaining process. Unlike
the traditional economic assumption of full information and perfect knowledge,
bounded rationality recognizes that in certain situations, we may find
systematic deficiencies in the ways that investors think and act, which require
the state to intervene to protect them. The danger here, of course, is that
whenever we regulate the substance of the parties' bargain we undermine the ex
ante incentives that they had to bargain efficiently.
The problems of close corporations provide many illustrations of the
conflict between protecting private bargains and recognizing the principle of
bounded rationality. Consider the private company that experiences the
unexpected death of its first-generation business founder followed by a
distribution of all of the firm's stock among her three children according to the
terms of the founder's will. Perhaps due to her untimely death, or perhaps
intentionally, the founder put in place no ancillary contracts defining the rights
of the future shareholders. Over time, two children become the controlling
managers of the business, while the third child is left in the position of a
minority shareholder. This child has no employment interest in the firm and
wants to be bought out. However, the controlling manager children are happy
to keep things the way they are-paying themselves high salaries and enjoying
the perks of office, while paying out as little as possible in dividends to their
sibling.
How should we resolve this situation? If we enforce the standard corporate
law presumption of majority rule, we leave the third child locked into the firm
for as long as the controlling shareholders want. In a world of perfect
information and complete knowledge, this must have been the bargain that the
founding parent intended by dying with a will that provided for pro-rata
distribution of her estate and no side agreements, such as buy-sell provisions.
Vol. 2.1, 2005
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Delaware seems to have accepted this perspective, leaving the minority-
shareholder child without much recourse.
However, if we take bounded rationality seriously, then we might ask
whether this outcome might not be the result of the founder's imperfect
knowledge and limited ability to act before dying. A sympathetic court
applying an involuntary dissolution statute could require the controlling
shareholders to buy out the third child if it believed that the current
arrangement was oppressive. Many states have corporate law statutes that
permit courts to take such action.
How much would this type of judicial intervention undermine the parties'
ex ante incentives? Certainly everything would have been much easier if the
founder had acted with perfect knowledge and complete foresight to explicitly
address this potential situation. If we solve the lock-in problem using the
involuntary dissolution statute in this case, we remove some incentives for
other founding families to act with greater foresight in the future, and we may
be disrupting the result that the founder intended. Still, I am left with this
nagging sense that the founder's bounded rationality is what caused the
situation to end up as it did. After all, what parent knowingly inflicts such
misery on their children?
There are two other challenges that we must address once we use bounded
rationality as a motive for letting government regulators and judges in the door:
first, how can we limit government interventions solely to those cases where
there are problems truly stemming from bounded rationality? Second, assuming
that we can limit intervention to such cases, how do we know that regulators
and judges will ex post get it right? Answering the first question would take me
far afield into debates about bureaucratic empires and questions of regulatory
capture, a fruitful trip for sure but far beyond the boundaries of this short Essay.
Suffice it to say, there are real concerns that we can draw hard lines that limit
government intervention effectively here. On the second question, though, I
think there is reason to expect that regulators and judges can ex post figure out
what the right term(s) should be. In this setting, regulators and judges have the
opportunity to gather the requisite information to make informed decisions that
will reach an appropriate result.
My second guiding principle is that corporate law should encourage greater
savings and investment with well-defined, bright-line rules that aid long-term
decision making and institutions that allocate capital to the highest valued
usage. Savings and investment are frequently long-term decisions, and people
will be more apt to undertake them if they know they will get what they
bargained for. Institutions, such as securities markets, that facilitate connecting
savers and investors, will benefit society by increasing the depth of financial
intermediation in the capital markets. This creates greater growth and faster
development in the economy.
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A related issue is whether growth will be faster with greater or lesser
degrees of income inequality. Economists disagree over whether greater
inequality leads to greater growth or vice versa. We know that the wealthy save
more than the poor. If their savings is productively invested, grows, and
remains in the hands of the few, then society's wealth will increase but become
more concentrated over time. Increased concentration of wealth may or may
not be a good thing, yet, we know that one feature of every modem capitalist
society is some degree of wealth redistribution from their richer to their poorer
members. Nevertheless, countries differ over how much redistribution they
engage in and the mechanism that they use to accomplish it.
The knottiest corporate law problem this question raises is whether
directors should place shareholders' interests at a higher level than other
corporate constituencies. If directors were to adopt a more European approach,
thereby elevating labor's interests closer to being on par with those of capital,
then presumably this would reallocate some wealth away from capital to labor.
Certainly, one of the underlying motivations behind union shareholder activism
in the United States has been to nudge directors toward more pro-labor
economic positions. To the extent this debate is decided politically within the
corporation, there is no need for corporate law to intervene. Even within a
regime of shareholder primacy, directors have plenty of room to choose
whether capital or labor interests need to be better protected to maximize the
long-run value of the firm.
For my purposes, the key issue is whether mandatory corporate law should
force directors to re-allocate corporate rents to further the goal of income
redistribution. If one were to embrace the goal of redistribution, I would think
that mandatory corporate law would be a very imprecise method of
accomplishing it. Should a board decide to further societal goals by mandating
that workers receive increased payments from the firm even if they are not
required to do so by contract? If so, should all workers receive the payments, or
should the board differentiate between them based on their abilities or
incomes? To my mind, tax policy and social welfare programs are better and
cleaner mechanisms by which to shift wealth between defined segments of the
population.
My next principle is that corporate law should minimize the transaction
costs associated with private bargaining. It should do so by offering the parties
a set of default rules. To the extent these rules are useful, they cut down on the
number of issues that the parties need to bargain over, and they lower the cost
of bargaining. The choice of what the right default rules are, though, has
efficiency implications because if the parties reject the rule and bargain around
it, they incur additional costs. Furthermore, the bounded rationality principle
might imply some systematic biases in determining who benefits from certain
default rules. For example, in a public company, managers could systematically
Vol. 2.1, 2005
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benefit from strong anti-takeover rules if investors fail to accurately price them
due to incomplete information or an inability to process efficiently available
information.
The race to the top versus race to the bottom debate provides an illustration
of the stakes in the choice of the default rule. Race to the bottom theorists argue
in favor of federalizing corporate law, while race to the top theorists have been
in favor of the existing system of state corporate law. Under a race to the
bottom point of view, if the default rules that Delaware has adopted
systematically favor managers over shareholders, then the parties could incur
additional transaction costs in bargaining around them or investors could fail to
adequately price these rules in deciding to buy shares of Delaware companies.
Mandatory federal law rules could be efficiency-enhancing if they provided
superior alternative default provisions, or led Delaware to adopt better
corporate law. Conversely, state law competition might yield superior default
rules if investors would prefer to have a choice of alternative regulatory
regimes available to them.
Fourth, corporate law should help minimize agency costs. Here, I think it is
important to distinguish between private companies and public companies due
to the problems created by the separation of ownership and control. In public
companies, where there is a separation of ownership and control, agency costs
are a significant issue. Good corporate law should help in the effort to minimize
those costs, along with norms, markets and internal and external corporate
governance mechanisms.
It is difficult to untangle the various strands of corporate governance to
determine which aspects add the most value. Corporate law's main contribution
could be its prohibition against self-dealing contained in the duty of loyalty.
Should it be a mandatory prohibition as it is for public corporations or should
we permit the parties to contract out of it as we do in many of the alphabet
entities that are widely used by private companies? The current legal distinction
has a lot to recommend it. In the private company context, the parties will
generally have better information, be more involved in the business, and better
understand the information that they have before them. Allowing investors to
contract out of the ban on self-dealing may well be value maximizing in this
setting. By contrast, in public companies, most shareholders will not be active
in the business, will have access only to public information, and may be
broadly diversified investors. Their ability to monitor manager (mis)conduct
will be very limited, and the limitations imposed by bounded rationality may
lead them to systematically underestimate its adverse impact on the value of
their investment. A broad prohibition against self-dealing could be justified on
this basis.
Finally, good corporate law should avoid creating negative externalities for
third parties, and where they are inevitable, it should create mechanisms to
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compensate injured parties for the harms suffered. One example of where we
do not seem to apply this principle in corporate law today is corporate limited
liability. In certain circumstances, a corporation can generate externalities that
harm others and then use the shield of limited liability to prevent those tort
victims from obtaining compensation from the investors in the firm.
Many authors have argued over the virtues of limited liability. The basic
debate revolves around whether it is better to stimulate investment by
permitting investors to externalize some corporate liabilities, or whether
corporations should be required to fully internalize all costs of their operation
so that some tort claimants are not left uncompensated. Under current law,
shareholders face joint and several liability for all corporate debts if we pierce
the corporate veil. Undoubtedly, public companies would see a much smaller
pool of equity capital if courts were willing to freely ignore the protections of
limited liability. This would be a very serious problem for large-scale
enterprises. If, however, we introduced a pro-rata liability regime for these
obligations, then the costs of piercing the corporate veil would be greatly
reduced. To me, despite the obvious collection difficulties it raises, this is
worth considering as a mechanism to force corporations to internalize more
fully their costs of operation.
Professor Klein's list contained quite a few other potential criteria for
evaluating corporate law, many of which I could add to my list. But I am going
to stop here and reflect on this new lesson that I have learned from Bill in using
his criteria and thank him for all he has contributed to me and our profession.
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